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ABSTRACT 
This research extended the traditional conceptualization of the postidentification 
feedback effect beyond retrospective self-reports to include the effects of feedback on 
eyewitnesses’ recognition memory for the originally-witnessed culprit.  Participant-
witnesses made inaccurate identifications and were given confirming, disconfirming, or 
no feedback.  Forty-eight hours later, witnesses were tested on their recognition memory 
for the culprit originally viewed.  Disconfirming feedback inhibited witnesses’ ability to 
discriminate between the culprit and never-before-seen filler photos. Witnesses who did 
not receive feedback showed the highest memory performance overall.  These results 
provide preliminary support for the idea that postidentification feedback negatively 
affects eyewitness recognition memory. 
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CHAPTER 1.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
One night in July of 1984, 22-year-old Jennifer Thompson was asleep in her bed 
when a man broke into her apartment, held a knife to her throat, and raped her.  
Determined to identify the assailant if she survived the attack, Jennifer deliberately 
studied the man’s face throughout the thirty minutes he was in her apartment.  Three days 
after the rape, Jennifer viewed a photo lineup at the police station and identified Ronald 
Cotton as her attacker. After announcing her identification, the detective remarked “We 
thought this might be the one.”  One week later, Jennifer again identified Ronald 
Cotton—this time from a live lineup—and was told, “That’s the one you picked out in the 
photo.”  She testified against Cotton in two separate trials.  Both times, the jury found 
Cotton guilty of rape and burglary and sentenced him to life plus fifty four years in 
prison.  After Cotton had served ten and a half years of his sentence, DNA testing 
exonerated Cotton and conclusively proved that a man named Bobby Poole was the 
rapist.  
This story is only one of many miscarriages of justice that resulted at least in part 
from mistaken eyewitness identifications.  Eyewitness misidentifications are the leading 
cause of wrongful convictions, accounting for 75% of DNA exoneration cases in the 
United States (www.innocenceproject.org).  Those who study eyewitness identification 
have long been aware of the fragile nature of eyewitness memory, but the extraordinary 
circumstances surrounding Jennifer’s story make this case particularly shocking. Jennifer 
had the opportunity to identify Bobby Poole—the actual attacker—during Ronald 
Cotton’s second trial.  Cotton’s lawyer had subpoenaed Poole, who was in prison for 
similar assaults, after inmates heard Poole bragging about getting away with raping 
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Jennifer and another woman on the same night. Yet when Jennifer viewed Poole in the 
courtroom, she denied ever having seen him and reasserted her certainty that Cotton was 
the assailant.  In an interview with Jennifer after Cotton’s exoneration, Jennifer was 
asked who she sees when she thinks of the rapist.  She answered: 
 “I still see Ronald Cotton. And I am not saying that to point a finger. I am just 
saying that is who I see. And I would love to erase that face out of my mind. I 
would do anything to erase that face out of my mind, but I can't. It is just in my 
head. Sometimes it is more fuzzy than others because my mind now says ‘Well, 
it's Bobby Poole,’ but it is still the face I see.” – PBS frontline 
What happened to Jennifer’s memory of Bobby Poole, the man whose face she 
carefully and methodically studied throughout the duration of the attack?  Why did she 
fail to recognize him when he stood before her in the courtroom?  Intuition might suggest 
that Jennifer’s memory of Bobby Poole somehow became obscured, lost, or replaced by 
the face of Ronald Cotton.  If Jennifer had seen Poole’s picture in the first photo lineup, 
surely she would have recognized him.  But would she have recognized him after she 
already picked Cotton from the photo lineup and was given reinforcing feedback by the 
detective (“We thought this might be the one”)?  What about after she chose Cotton in the 
live lineup and learned that she picked the same man as the photos?   
A long line of psychological research has established that human memory is 
malleable (Loftus, 2005).  Studies examining the effects of misleading post-event 
information on memory, source monitoring errors, and rich false memories all support the 
idea that recollections of the past are subject to distortion arising from a host of sources.  
Over thirty years of research on eyewitness memory in particular has led to an increased 
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understanding of the different factors that affect eyewitnesses’ recollections of criminal 
events.  Perhaps one of the most significant findings that emerged from that body of work 
is that witnesses’ memory can be influenced substantially by post-event suggestion 
provided to them after they have made an identification.  For example, telling witnesses 
whether or not the person they identified is the suspect of the police investigation has 
been found to affect witnesses’ subsequent memory reports in dramatic ways.  
Confirming feedback like the kind Jennifer received (“We thought this might be the 
one.”) inflates witnesses’ reports of how certain they recall having been at the time of the 
identification and distorts their recollections of the witnessing experience, leading 
witnesses to report having experienced more favorable witnessing conditions (i.e., that 
they paid more attention during the crime, had a better view of the culprit, etc.).  This is 
called the postidentification feedback effect (Wells & Bradfield, 1998).   
In the original postidentification feedback effect studies (Wells & Bradfield, 
1998), witnesses to simulated crimes made identification attempts from lineups and were 
then randomly assigned to receive confirming feedback (e.g., “Good, you identified the 
suspect”) or no feedback.  All witnesses who made identifications were mistaken because 
they were given a culprit-absent lineup. Witnesses were later asked a number of 
testimony-relevant questions regarding their certainty (“At the time of your identification, 
how certain were you that you identified the actual culprit?”), view (“How good was the 
view you had of the culprit?” “How well could you make out details of the culprit’s 
face?”), and attention (“How much attention did you pay to the culprit’s face?”). Results 
of these original studies and many subsequent studies show that confirming feedback 
strongly inflates witnesses’ estimates of how certain they recall having been at the time of 
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the identification, how good their view was, how well they could make out details of the 
culprit’s face, and how closely they attended to the culprit during the crime (Bradfield, 
Wells, & Olson, 2002; Dixon & Memon, 2005; Wells & Bradfield, 1999; Wells, Olson, 
& Charman, 2003). Whereas past research has repeatedly demonstrated robust distorting 
effects of feedback on self-report measures like identification certainty and witnesses’ 
recollections of the witnessing experience, to date little research has addressed the effects 
of postidentification feedback on another critical component of eyewitness memory: 
memory of the culprit.  The present research aimed to expand upon our understanding of 
how postidentification feedback affects eyewitness memory by testing whether 
postidentification feedback about an inaccurate identification influences witnesses’ 
ability to later recognize the culprit. 
There is reason to believe that in addition to distorting witnesses’ subjective 
recollections of their certainty, view, and attention, postidentification feedback may also 
impair objective memory of the witnessed event.  Multiple studies have shown that other 
forms of social influence can distort memory for past events.  For example, social 
influence led people to report having seen an accomplice in a series of pictures when 
there was none (Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000).  Reinforcement from questioners has 
caused children to make false claims about a past event (Garven, Wood, Malpass, & 
Shaw, 1998).  Innocent people have even falsely confessed to crimes because coercive 
and suggestive interrogation tactics led them to believe they actually committed the crime 
(Kassin, 1997).  Although it is well-established that postidentification feedback distorts 
witnesses’ retrospective reports of certainty and subjective recollections of the witnessing 
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experience, the extent to which feedback shares the propensity to alter memory for 
objective details of a past event is still unclear. 
A long-standing line of work in the field of cognitive psychology, which has 
examined closely the influence of post-event information on memory for objective details 
of a past event, is of particular relevance to the present research question.  The focus of 
this work has been on the detrimental effects of misleading post-event information, or 
misinformation, on memory.  The traditional misinformation research paradigm consists 
of three stages.  In the classic experiments utilizing the paradigm (e.g. Loftus, 1979; 
Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), participants first saw a simulated traffic accident.  
Everyone then received either consistent or misleading information about some details of 
the event through a post-event narrative or post-event questioning.  For example, a stop 
sign was referred to as a yield sign.  Finally, participants were asked whether they saw a 
stop sign or a yield sign.  These studies consistently found that participants who were 
exposed to the misinformation were more likely to report having seen the yield sign than 
were those not exposed to misinformation.  This bias in memory resulting from exposure 
to misleading post-event information has been termed the “misinformation effect”.  
Loftus and her colleagues suggested that exposure to misinformation impairs memory for 
the original event detail because the suggested information either alters or overwrites the 
original memory trace. 
Following these pioneering misinformation studies, a lively debate emerged 
between the camp of individuals who supported the interpretation that misinformation 
impairs memory for the original event (e.g., Tversky & Tuchin, 1989; Belli, 1989) and 
those who contended that the original memory trace is not affected by misinformation 
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(e.g., McCloskey and Zaragoza, 1985).  For decades now, researchers have grappled with 
the question of whether information, once stored in long-term memory, can ever be lost.  
Some people take the position that stored information is permanent and that all 
“forgetting” is simply a result of retrieval failure.  But the question of information loss 
versus retrieval failure can never be resolved in an absolute sense (Loftus & Loftus, 
1980).  It is impossible to test whether a memory detriment is due to genuine loss or 
impairment, or whether the information is still buried in memory just unable to be 
retrieved.  Fortunately, the present research does not require that we know the answer to 
this age-old question because the main variable of interest is a behavior-performance 
variable.  Hence, the focus of the current experiment is on the applied effects of 
misinformation, namely the extent to which feedback misinformation affects witnesses’ 
ability to recognize the culprit.  The question of whether a decrease in memory 
performance is due to the memory of the culprit being altered, lost, or simply made 
inaccessible to retrieval is not a principal concern of this research.  If witnesses who 
receive postidentification feedback demonstrate impaired performance during the final 
test, a memory detriment will be assumed to have occurred. For the purposes of this 
work, “memory detriment” does not assume the occurrence of a particular underlying 
process; only that memory test performance has been impaired.   
What is of particular importance to the present research is the fact that through the 
course of this debate, a new paradigm for testing misinformation effects was born.  
Researchers who opposed the view that misinformation impairs the original memory 
trace were particularly concerned with the type of test used in the original misinformation 
studies.  Specifically, in the original tests of the misinformation effect (Loftus, 1979; 
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Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), participants were forced to make a choice between 
having seen either the misled item or the original item.  McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) 
argued that participants who chose the misled item on the final memory test may have 
remembered the original item but chose to select the misled item because of demand 
characteristics. Or perhaps they chose the misled item not because their memory for the 
original item was impaired but because they never encoded the original item to begin 
with.  In an attempt to deal with these issues, McCloskey and Zaragoza created a new 
test—the modified test—which they suggested was better suited to assess the impact of 
misinformation on the original memory.  For purposes of specificity, this modified testing 
format will be referred to as the “misinformation-absent test”.  Rather than presenting the 
misled detail as an option on the final test, the misinformation-absent test required 
participants to choose between the original event detail and a new, never before seen 
item.  The authors argued that if misinformation actually impairs memory for the original 
detail, then participants who received misinformation should be less likely than control 
participants to correctly identify the item originally seen.  Hence, the misinformation-
absent test was proposed as a “cleaner” test of misinformation effects on memory.  
Although the misinformation-absent test has been found to be a less sensitive test of 
misinformation effects, the present research utilized an adapted version of this paradigm 
for reasons that will be explained in depth later. 
The present research draws a link between the postidentification feedback effect 
and the misinformation effect because both of these phenomena involve situations in 
which a social influence variable affects recollections of the past.  But there is a critical 
distinction between these two lines of work.  Research on postidentification feedback has 
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tended to focus on how misinformation in the form of feedback alters witnesses’ 
retrospective self-reports (i.e. certainty at the time of the identification; goodness of view 
and attention paid), whereas research on the misinformation effect examines the impact 
of misleading post-event information on the ability to recall original event details (i.e. the 
“who”, “what” and “where”).  Thus, misinformation effect research is primarily 
concerned with objective recollections of concrete information directly related to a 
witnessed event.  Postidentification feedback studies, on the other hand, examine 
memories related to the witness’ subjective experience.  Because the present research is 
concerned with the effects of postidentification feedback on concrete, person-specific 
recognition memory, it draws from both areas of study and their respective research 
paradigms. 
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CHAPTER 2.  THE PARADIGM 
The present experiment constituted a unique test of the effects of misinformation 
in the form of postidentification feedback on eyewitness memory for a concrete event 
detail.  Accordingly, the research paradigm combined aspects of the postidentification 
feedback paradigm and the misinformation paradigm.  Aside from a few differences, it 
was conceptually similar to the misinformation-absent test of the misinformation effect.   
Participants first viewed a video of a crime and attempted to identify the culprit 
from a culprit-absent lineup.  Some participants then received misinformation in the form 
of confirming feedback following their identification, others received disconfirming 
feedback, and a control group did not receive feedback.  After a 48-hour delay, all 
participants were given a test of their memory of the culprit in the form of a culprit-
present photo lineup that included the culprit plus five new, never-before-seen fillers.   
The first (culprit-absent) lineup that was presented to participants after they 
viewed the video can be conceived of as an initial memory test.  This is similar to the 
misinformation paradigm, in which misleading information is often provided through a 
post-event test.  A critical distinction of the current paradigm, however, is that all 
participants were exposed to some misinformation, namely a photo lineup that did not 
include a photo of the culprit.  Whereas control groups in traditional misinformation 
studies are only exposed to consistent event information, control group participants in the 
present experiment viewed information inconsistent with the original event (the culprit-
absent lineup) and made mistaken identifications.  Past research has found that people 
perform more poorly on final recognition test items when they had earlier responded to 
versions of those items with exclusively incorrect test alternatives (Schooler et al., 1988).  
10 
 
Schooler and colleagues suggested that the act of committing to an incorrect alternative 
interferes with ones subsequent ability to recognize the correct alternative.  In 
consideration of these findings, this paradigm was pilot tested in the absence of feedback 
to establish a reasonable base rate of recognition accuracy.   
Although all participants who made an identification from the first lineup 
committed to an incorrect alternative, the presence or absence of feedback regarding their 
choice was the critical misinformation manipulation.  Whereas participants in the 
confirming feedback group were told that they identified the actual suspect, control group 
participants did not know whether or not their selection was correct, and participants who 
received disconfirming feedback were told that their selection was incorrect.   
This paradigm is reminiscent of the misinformation-absent test of the 
misinformation effect because the misleading item (e.g., the filler photo selected from the 
culprit-absent lineup) was excluded from the final test.  There are two reasons why this 
misinformation-absent testing format was ideal for the present experiment.  First, 
presenting a photo lineup that includes the culprit and five new filler photos constituted a 
“clean” test for the participants.  Past research has shown that witnesses are more likely 
to incorrectly identify from a lineup a person whose photo was seen previously 
(Deffenbacher et al., 2006; Hinz & Pezdek, 2001).  Therefore, it was important that the 
second lineup consisted of all new filler photos.  The second reason for using new filler 
photos in the culprit-present lineup was to avoid contaminating the results with 
commitment effects due to participants wanting to appear consistent.  It is well 
established that people are motivated by a need to appear consistent with their previous 
behaviors and commitments (Cialdini & Trost 1998).  If the misleading item (i.e., the 
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photo previously identified from the culprit-absent lineup) had been included in the final 
memory test, participants may have favored the previously-chosen photo despite 
recognizing the culprit.  Many eyewitness studies have demonstrated a commitment 
effect of this sort (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, and Penrod, 2006; Dysart, Lindsay, 
Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001; Memon, Hope, Bartlett, & Bull, 2002).  Although it could 
be argued that Jennifer Thompson’s case did not resemble a misinformation-absent test 
(Bobby Poole was presented to her at Ronald Cotton’s second trial), the primary purpose 
of the current research was to determine whether witnesses’ ability to recognize the 
culprit is influenced by postidentification feedback about the initial identification.  
Hence, in an effort to disentangle memory effects from commitment effects, the present 
paradigm utilized a “commitment-free” test of memory performance.   
Because this research tested a novel prediction regarding the effects of 
postidentification feedback on recognition memory, it was important to utilize dependent 
measures that were sensitive to subtle memory changes.  A traditional identification task 
that uses the dichotomous dependent measure of identification accuracy would not detect, 
for example, relative differences in perceived similarity of the culprit versus the other 
lineup members to the participants’ memory of the culprit.  Therefore, rather than simply 
asking participants to make an identification from the second lineup, this experiment 
assessed the extent to which postidentification feedback influenced participants’ 
similarity ratings of the culprit’s photo to their memory of the culprit. Participants who 
receive feedback may rate the culprit as being relatively less similar to their memory of 
the culprit than participants who do not receive feedback; however, the culprit may still 
be the person who they rate is most similar of all the lineup members to their memory of 
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the culprit.  A traditional identification procedure would not detect this more subtle 
effect.  Using a similarity measure rather than administering a new identification task also 
allowed for the examination of feedback effects on memory while participants still 
believed that the feedback they received was accurate. 
Leading mistaken witnesses to believe that their erroneous identifications were in 
fact accurate (in the case of confirming feedback) creates a situation similar to what 
witnesses may experience in misinformation studies.  Specifically, Loftus (1992) argued 
that when post-event information contradicts a witness’ original memory, the information 
can become incorporated into memory, supplementing or altering a witness’ initial 
recollection.  Post-event information serves as a form of feedback regarding the witness’ 
recollection of an event detail (i.e., “I thought I saw a stop sign but I guess it was a yield 
sign”).  Similarly, whereas witnesses may initially have a strong memory of the culprit’s 
appearance, being informed that their selection of another individual—one who does not 
match exactly their memory of the culprit—was “correct” may lead witnesses to adjust 
their recollections of the culprit accordingly (i.e., “I thought he had a big nose, but I guess 
it actually wasn’t big.”).  Witnesses may consciously or unconsciously make mental 
adjustments of this sort after receiving confirming feedback about their identification.   
As a result, these witnesses may retain a weaker memory for the appearance of the 
culprit.  This interpretation would predict an opposite pattern for witnesses who receive 
disconfirming feedback.  After making an inaccurate identification and receiving 
disconfirming feedback, witnesses may partake in the opposite kinds of rationalizations 
(i.e., I didn’t think his nose was that small) and thereby retain a stronger memory of the 
original culprit’s facial features or general appearance.   
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Another possibility is that witnesses who receive disconfirming feedback will 
perform at least as poorly on the recognition memory test for the culprit as witnesses who 
receive confirming feedback.  This is based on what will be termed the memory-
interference interpretation.  According to this interpretation, postidentification feedback 
of any kind will cause memory interference that will lead to subsequently poorer 
performance on the memory test.  In the case of confirming feedback, the face of the 
misidentified person is reinforced as a result of the feedback, thereby causing interference 
with memory of the face of the original culprit.  Working against the memory impairment 
effect for confirming feedback is the fact that witnesses tend to identify someone who 
looks like the culprit. It is generally well accepted that witnesses identify the person in 
the lineup who most closely resembles their memory of the culprit (Wells, 1984). Hence, 
differences between the identified person and the culprit are not likely to be very large, 
resulting in only small effects in terms of memory impairment for the original culprit. 
Witnesses who receive disconfirming feedback, in contrast, have their preferred choice of 
a lineup member disconfirmed, suggesting to them that the culprit looked different from 
the person they identified and leading them to consider the idea that it was one of the 
persons they rejected. Disconfirming that choice should lead them to reconsider their 
memory and think that the culprit must have been one of the less similar persons who 
they had rejected. This, in turn, might lead them to recall one of the rejected lineup 
members who, on average, should be even less similar to the culprit than was the person 
they identified. This, in turn could lead to a stronger interference effect for the 
disconfirming feedback than for the confirming feedback.   
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CHAPTER 3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Psychologists who study eyewitness identification generally believe that a 
mistaken identification taints the witness' memory toward the identified person (Wells & 
Quinlivan, 2009), but few studies have investigated how postidentification feedback may 
exacerbate this bias.  Two studies that addressed similar research questions will be 
discussed below, however neither of these studies was designed nor intended to 
specifically address the hypothesis that postidentification feedback impairs witnesses’ 
memory of the crime culprit.  
A study conducted by Dixon and Memon (2005) examined the effects of 
identification feedback on the quantity and accuracy of crime event details recalled and 
witnesses’ willingness to answer misleading questions.  In their study, witnesses viewed a 
crime video and made an identification from a culprit-absent lineup.  They then received 
confirming, disconfirming, or no feedback and were asked questions probing their 
memory for details regarding the crime and culprit.  The authors did not find a significant 
effect of feedback on the overall quantity and accuracy of details recalled or willingness 
to answer misleading questions, although disconfirming feedback significantly reduced 
eyewitness confidence in recall accuracy.   
These findings do not threaten the integrity of the present research for two 
reasons.  The first reason is that Dixon and Memon (2005) tested the effects of feedback 
on recall of details, rather than on recognition for the object of the feedback (the culprit).  
Because there are a number of variables that affect recall and recognition in different 
ways, it has been suggested that different processes may underlie these two types of 
memory performance (Anderson & Bower, 1972).  It is therefore important to examine 
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independently the effects of feedback on recognition memory.  Furthermore, of the 25-
item memory questionnaire utilized in their study, only four questions specifically 
assessed memory for the culprit.  An example they gave of this category of questions is 
“What colour was the robber’s hair?”  Questions like this one do not serve as an 
appropriate test of feedback effects on memory for the culprit because the lineup fillers in 
this study were selected “on the basis of their physical similarity [to the culprit]” and, 
presumably, all had the same hair color.  In order to detect effects of feedback on general 
description measures, it is necessary that differences between the culprit and the 
misidentified person exist in the first place, so that details observed during the original 
event can be distinguished from ones that were gleaned from the photo lineup.  Without 
seeing the materials used by the researchers, one must assume that answers to questions 
regarding the culprit’s general appearance would be correct or incorrect for both the 
culprit and the filler, thereby limiting these findings.   
The second important caveat to their results is that the post-event questionnaire 
was administered to participants immediately after they received feedback.  The lack of a 
delay between the feedback manipulation and the final memory test may have dampened 
the effects of feedback on memory of crime details.  The current research assumes that a 
memory detriment resulting from feedback, if present, would manifest itself over time 
rather than immediately.  One line of reasoning that could account for this possibility is if 
confirming feedback leads witnesses to rely on their memory of the identified person 
rather than the original culprit.  After receiving confirming feedback, witnesses may no 
longer differentiate between the person who committed the crime and the person they 
identified from the lineup. Thus, when a witness who was told “You got the guy!” thinks 
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back to the crime, he or she may substitute the image of the identified person, believing it 
to be the same person.  Confirming feedback may in a sense grant permission to 
witnesses to consider the criminal and the identified person effectively interchangeable.  
With repeated retrievals of the identified person’s image rather the image of the 
perpetrator, the witness may gradually lose access to the memory of the originally 
witnessed perpetrator.  This process, however, is likely not instantaneous and would 
therefore best be tested after a period of delay.   
A similar test of the hypothesis that feedback affects witnesses’ ability to later 
identify the culprit can be found in a set of studies investigating the effects of viewing a 
show-up on accuracy in a subsequent lineup (Lawson &, Dysart, 2010, unpublished).  
Participants in this experiment viewed a crime video and then viewed a single photograph 
(show-up) of an individual who either was or was not the culprit.  Some participants then 
received confirming feedback about their show-up decision and others received no 
feedback.  Although the authors did not find significant effects of feedback on accuracy 
or choosing rates from a subsequent lineup, a few methodological considerations may 
account for the null findings.   
First, culprit presence was manipulated during the initial show-up, such that only 
half of the participants viewed a culprit-absent show-up.  Within the culprit-absent show-
up condition, only 19.3% of participants made a false identification, and presumably only 
half of those (~9.6%) were assigned to the confirming feedback conditions.  Thus, only 
about 4.8% of the entire sample (approximately 15 participants) made an inaccurate 
identification from the show-up and then received confirming feedback.  These numbers 
do not constitute a legitimate test of the idea that confirming feedback about a prior 
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inaccurate identification impairs memory for the original culprit person.  In addition, the 
misleading show-up person was always included in the final lineup.  As previously 
discussed, this type of test is better suited for studying commitment effects rather than 
memory impairment.  Finally, like Dixon and Memon’s (2005) study, the final memory 
test shortly followed the feedback manipulation, potentially further limiting these 
findings.   
The present experiment involved two procedural nuances that are regarded as 
crucial to detecting feedback effects on memory of the culprit.  First, the photo of the 
misidentified person was visible to participants during and shortly after the feedback 
manipulation.  The null findings in the aforementioned studies (Dixon & Memon, 2005; 
Lawson &, Dysart, 2010, unpublished) may be due at least in part to the fact that 
participants were likely not able to process the identified person’s face after receiving 
feedback.  In the real world, witnesses are typically exposed to the misidentified person 
on multiple occasions before the trial hearing takes place.  Thus, in an attempt to best 
recreate what may be an important precondition of this phenomenon, participants were 
able to continue viewing the identified person during and shortly after the receipt of 
feedback.   
Based on the assumption that feedback exerts its influence on memory over time 
rather than immediately, the second procedural consideration was to introduce a period of 
delay between the first identification procedure and the final memory test.  In addition, 
rarely (if ever) would a real eyewitness receive confirming feedback about an 
identification and then be asked immediately to perform a new photo lineup procedure 
for the same person.  More likely is that after new facts have surfaced (i.e. the identified 
18 
 
suspect provides an iron-clad alibi or is otherwise proven to be innocent), the witness 
may then be asked to perform a new identification.  In Jennifer Thompson’s case, she 
viewed Bobby Poole for the first time more than three years after the crime occurred—
after she had already identified Ronald Cotton from a photo lineup, a live lineup, and in 
court.  In her interview, Jennifer recollected, “When I would have a nightmare, when I 
would re-live the night in my head, Ronald Cotton's head, his face was right there for me 
to see for years.” 
  
19 
 
CHAPTER 4.  MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants and Design 
A total of 125 participants were recruited through the on-line SONA system in the 
Psychology Department at Iowa State University.  
 The study used a between-participants design with three levels of the independent 
variable: confirming, disconfirming, or no feedback.  It was conducted in two sessions, 
48 hours apart. 
Materials 
The stimulus video viewed by participants depicted an airport scene in which a 
suspicious individual switched his luggage bag with another passenger’s bag at the 
check-in line (Appendix A). After switching the bag, the culprit exited the airport. The 
video lasted one minute-twenty eight seconds and showed multiple views of the culprit’s 
face.   
The first lineup viewed by participants was a six-person culprit-absent photo 
lineup in which all six lineup members fit the general description of the culprit, but none 
of whom was the actual culprit (Appendix B).  After making an identification, 
participants answered a series of questions (Appendix C) intended to assess certainty in 
their identification and other testimony-relevant judgments.  The questionnaire, adapted 
from Wells and Bradfield (1998), has been used in a large share of the research on 
eyewitness identification and was based in part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s criteria for 
identifying a reliable witness (Neil v. Biggers, 1972; Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977).   
The final memory test was in the form of a six-person culprit-present photo 
lineup, which consisted of a photo of the actual culprit and five new filler photos of 
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individuals who matched the general description of the culprit (Appendix D).  The 
culprit’s photo was rotated throughout all six positions in six different versions of the 
lineup to which participants were randomly assigned.  Response latencies were collected 
for all measures. 
Procedure 
The experiment took part during two sessions, 48 hours apart.  Both sessions were 
conducted on a lab computer, and all of the dependent measures were collected in 
MediaLab in order to minimize experimenter expectancy effects.   
Session 1: Video and Feedback Misinformation 
Upon entering the lab, participants were instructed to read the informed consent 
document and sign it if they agreed to participate.  Participants were told that the study 
involved “perceptions of people” and that they would watch a short video and answer 
questions.  They were instructed to watch the video carefully and to pay attention to any 
suspicious activity.  
After watching the video, participants were told that the actual purpose of the 
study was for them to identify from a lineup the person who switched bags.  All 
participants were then shown the six-person culprit-absent lineup.  In line with 
procedures from the original postidentification feedback study (Wells & Bradfield, 1998), 
participants were given biased lineup instructions, meaning that they were not informed 
that the culprit “may or may not be present” nor were they given the option to select “Not 
There”. Previous experiments utilizing this procedure have found that nearly 100% of the 
participants make an identification.   
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Following their identification decision, participants were randomly assigned to 
receive either confirming feedback (“Good!  You identified the actual suspect”), 
disconfirming feedback (“Actually, that’s incorrect. That wasn’t the suspect”) or no 
feedback.  The feedback was administered both on the computer screen and by the 
experimenter.  The feedback administered on the computer was presented concurrently 
with the image of the identified person.   
Finally, participants answered a series of questions (Appendix C) to assess 
certainty in the identification and other testimony-relevant judgments.  They were 
instructed to return 48 hours later in order to answer additional questions about what they 
witnessed and whom they identified.  Before leaving, the experimenter told participants: 
“Try to imagine that you are a real eyewitness to a crime.  You will be coming 
back to answer more questions in two days, similar to what a real eyewitness 
might have to do.  So it is important for you to try not to forget about what you 
witnessed today.  Just like a real eyewitness to a crime, you may want to think 
about what you witnessed so that you can provide accurate information when you 
come back.”   
Email reminder 
Immediately following the first session, a member of the research team e-mailed 
the participant ostensibly to remind him/her of the upcoming session.  The true purpose 
of the reminder email was to induce the participant to reflect upon what occurred during 
the first session.  In doing so, the email served as an attempt to replicate the experience of 
a real eyewitness, who would likely ruminate over the crime event and the identification 
experience.  
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The e-mail specifically reminded the participant of the time and date of the 
upcoming session.  The participant was informed that among other tasks, he or she would 
be asked to provide a written description of the culprit and should therefore make an 
effort to retain a memory of the person who was viewed in the video.  The e-mail 
reminded participants that they would be asked additional questions about what they 
witnessed and whom they identified.  Instructions similar to these are customarily given 
to real eyewitnesses to crimes.  For example, a police officer may tell a witness to expect 
to speak with a prosecuting attorney or the defense attorney about the identification and 
the witnessed event.   
Session 2: Memory test 
When participants returned to the lab 48-hours after the first session, they were 
prompted to provide a detailed written description of the culprit.  The purpose of 
obtaining this description was to reinstate the context of their prior visit.   
Participants were then presented with the culprit-present lineup (Appendix D) and 
were asked to rate on a scale from 0%-100% the similarity of each lineup member to their 
memory of the culprit.  After collecting the similarity ratings, which constituted the main 
dependent measure, participants were also asked to rank the photos from who is most to 
least similar to their memory of the culprit and to indicate whether they think any of the 
people in the lineup was the person from the video (Yes/No).  If they answered “yes”, 
they were asked to indicate who.  If they answer “no”, they were asked, “If you had to 
choose someone who looks most like your memory of the person who switched the bags, 
whom would you choose?”  
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Participants then answered the same dependent measure questions to assess their 
original witnessing experience (Appendix C).  Last, they completed a manipulation check 
in which they were asked to identify their feedback condition and they answered a 
question about whether they received and read the reminder e-mail.  Following their 
participation, participants were debriefed and given an opportunity to ask questions. 
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CHAPTER 5.  RESULTS 
Attrition 
 A total of eight participants did not return for the second session—two from the 
confirming feedback condition, one from the disconfirming feedback condition, and five 
from the control condition.  Because complete data did not exist for these participants, 
they were excluded from further analyses. 
Receipt of e-mail and Manipulation Check 
 At the end of the second session, all participants were asked whether they 
received and read the reminder e-mail that was sent to them after their first session.  
Ninety-eight of the 117 remaining participants (83.3%) reported having received and read 
the e-mail. These rates did not differ as a function of feedback condition.  As a 
manipulation check, participants were asked to identify the kind of feedback (if any) that 
they received after their first-session identification.  Only three of the participants were 
unable to accurately report on their feedback condition—two in the confirming feedback 
condition and one in the disconfirming feedback condition.  These participants were 
excluded from the analyses, leaving a total of 114 participants for the remaining analyses. 
Primary Measures 
Similarity ratings 
On the whole, participants rated the percent similarity of the culprit to their 
memory of the culprit as quite high (M = 80.12) relative to the filler photo with the 
highest average rating (Number 5, M = 47.39).  This finding suggests that participants 
retained a relatively strong memory of the culprit.  The average of all the filler similarity 
ratings was 22.59.  A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to assess the 
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main effect of postidentification feedback on participants’ similarity ratings of the culprit, 
the average similarity ratings of the fillers, and the difference between the culprit and the 
average filler ratings (Table 1).  There were no significant differences between feedback 
conditions for participants’ perceptions of the similarity of the culprit to their memory of 
the culprit, F(2, 111) = 1.33, p = .27, nor was there a significant difference in the average 
similarity rating for the filler photos, F(2, 111) = 1.58, p = .21.  There was, however, a 
marginally significant effect of feedback on the difference ratings, which measured 
“discriminatory recognition”, or the extent to which participants judged the culprit to be 
similar to their memory of the culprit over and above the fillers, F(2, 111) = 2.57, p = .08.  
Discriminatory recognition was computed by subtracting the average filler similarity 
rating from the culprit similarity rating.  The disconfirming feedback group exhibited the 
lowest discriminatory recognition, (M = 49.88) compared to the confirming feedback 
group (M = 58.12) and the control group (M = 65.65).  Follow up Games-Howell simple 
effects tests indicated that relative to the control group, participants who received 
disconfirming feedback were less able to accurately discriminate between the culprit and 
the fillers, Mdiff = 15.77, p = .06, d = .53, 95% CI [-.46, 32.00].  In other words, the 
ability for participants to detect differential similarity of the culprit relative to the filler 
photos was reduced for participants who received disconfirming feedback.  There were 
no significant differences between the confirming feedback and control groups; however, 
the pattern of differences was in the predicted direction. 
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Table 1 - Mean Similarity Ratings (0% - 100%) 
Condition Culprit Filler Average Culprit-Filler Ave 
(Difference) 
Confirming 81.49 23.36 58.12 
Disconfirming 75.12 25.24 49.88 
Control  84.42 18.77 65.65 
Total Average 80.12 22.59 57.88 
 
Identification accuracy 
After rating and ranking the photos, participants were asked whether they 
believed that the culprit was in the photo lineup.  If they answered affirmatively, they 
were asked to indicate who; if they answered negatively, they were prompted to provide a 
“best guess” of the identity of the culprit.  The responses of participants who chose 
voluntarily and those who chose when forced were combined to create a measure of 
identification accuracy.  Identification accuracy was analyzed using a Pearson Chi-square 
Goodness-of-fit test, which did not reach statistical significance, χ2 = 3.98, p = .14.  
However, the group patterns of identification accuracy reflected the trend of the culprit 
rank scores, such that participants who received disconfirming feedback tended to be less 
accurate (70.73% accuracy) in identifying the culprit from the group of photos than were 
participants in the confirming feedback (81.08% accuracy) and control (88.89% 
accuracy) groups.  These trends were not a result of differential choosing rates; the three 
groups did not differ in the belief that the culprit was among the set of photos.  In other 
words, the proportion of participants who chose voluntarily and those who were forced to 
choose did not differ systematically as a function of feedback condition.   
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An examination of the accuracy rates of participants who chose voluntarily versus 
choosing only when forced indicates that the disparate accuracy rates were driven 
primarily by participants who chose only when forced to do so.  Whereas the accuracy 
rates for participants who chose voluntarily were within five percentage points of one 
another (Table 2), the accuracy rates for participants who were forced to choose varied 
greatly: 85.71% of participants in the control group were accurate versus 70.00% in the 
confirming feedback group and 36.36% in the disconfirming feedback group.  In 
exhibiting caution due to small cell sizes (7, 10, and 11, respectively), statistical tests 
were not conducted for the “forced choice” subset of participants. 
Table 2 - Identification Accuracy 
 Confirming Disconfirming Control 
Voluntary Choosers 85.19% 83.33% 89.66% 
Forced Choosers 70.00% 36.36% 85.71% 
Combined 81.08% 70.73% 88.89% 
 
Response Latencies 
 An examination of response latencies from the Time 2 memory test measures 
indicated a marginally significant effect of feedback condition on the time it took 
participants to render a similarity rating for the culprit’s photo, F(2, 111) = 2.91, p = .06.  
Participants in the control condition took more time to render a similarity rating for the 
culprit (M = 14928 ms) than did participants in the confirming (M = 11243 ms) and 
disconfirming feedback conditions (M = 10247 ms).  Results of follow-up Games-Howell 
simple effects tests suggested that participants in the control condition took significantly 
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longer than did participants in the disconfirming feedback condition to render a similarity 
judgment (Mdiff = 4680 ms, p = .07, d = .54, 95% CI [227 ms, 9589 ms]).  There was not 
a reliable effect of feedback on response latency times to rate the similarity of the filler 
photos or to complete the ranking or choosing tasks. 
Self-report measures 
 The next set of analyses examined participants’ answers to the traditional 
postidentification feedback effect self-report measures both from Time 1 and from Time 
2.  In line with past research, there was a main effect of postidentification feedback on 
participants’ self-reports of attention, basis, certainty, ease, face, image, strangers, time, 
view, and willing, both at Time 1 and at Time 2 (all ps ≤ .01, see Appendix C for variable 
descriptions).  Because the postidentification feedback effect has been widely established 
and the present research was not intended to examine the effects of feedback on the self-
report variables, details regarding the pair-wise analyses for each of these variables will 
not be provided, but means are reported in Table 3.  Instead, a one-way MANOVA was 
conducted for all ten self-report variables, with the time variable being reverse-coded.  
Past research has used MANOVAs to examine these variables together because they can 
be conceived of as underlying a common “witness self-reported reliability” dimension.  
In other words, witnesses who tend to report that they were highly certain also tend to 
have higher standing on the other criteria, and vice versa.  
During the first session, participants who received confirming feedback had a 
significantly higher standing on the “witness reliability” criteria than participants who 
received disconfirming feedback or no feedback (ps < .01).  The self-reports of 
participants who received disconfirming feedback were lower than those of participants 
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in the control group, and this difference was marginally significant (p = .09).  The same 
pattern (Confirming > Control > Disconfirming) held for participants’ reports during the 
second session, however all three groups’ Time 2 reports were statistically different from 
one another (all ps <.01).   
Table 2 - Time 1 and Time 2 Self-Report Dependent Measures  
 Confirming  Disconfirming  Control  
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 Time 1 Time 2 
Certainty 75.4 (18.2) 83.2 (19.0) 46.1 (25.4) 45.4 (26.0) 56.1 (29.0) 54.2 (29.0) 
View 9.46 (1.52) 9.41 (1.59) 7.90 (2.02) 7.61 (1.97) 8.58 (2.58) 8.61 (2.35) 
Face 8.43 (1.88) 8.46 (1.88) 6.93 (1.90) 7.15 (2.02) 7.89 (2.46) 8.17 (2.09) 
Attention 8.62 (1.77) 8.49 (2.06) 7.05 (1.96) 6.78 (2.16) 7.92 (2.14) 7.94 (2.11) 
Basis 8.62 (2.03) 8.54 (1.84) 6.68 (2.06) 5.90 (2.30) 7.92 (2.14) 6.72 (2.75) 
Ease 7.38 (2.31) 7.89 (1.98) 3.90 (2.40) 3.95 (2.01) 5.78 (2.60) 6.17 (2.81) 
Time 5.30 (2.30) 5.19 (2.20) 7.34 (2.22) 6.93 (2.45) 5.81 (3.11) 5.92 (3.15) 
Willing 7.89 (2.46) 8.14 (2.32) 3.56 (2.51) 3.41 (2.10) 5.28 (3.02) 5.25 (2.90) 
Strangers 7.81 (1.94) 7.95 (1.80) 6.00 (2.62) 5.93 (2.22) 7.56 (3.00) 7.67 (2.56) 
Image 8.22 (1.53) 7.51 (2.06) 6.20 (2.22) 5.93 (2.42) 7.50 (2.38) 7.53 (2.18) 
       
Mean(SD) 
 
Ancillary analyses 
The nature of the time-delay paradigm used in the present research allowed for an 
assessment of change in witnesses’ retrospective self-reports from the first session to 
second session, 48-hours later.  Past research has found that eyewitness confidence 
increases as a result of repeated questioning (Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 1996) or if 
witnesses are told to prepare for cross-examination (Wells et al., 1981).  In the present 
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study, participants were instructed to prepare for additional questioning, and they 
answered questions about their certainty, attention, view etc. two times.  Thus, there is 
some reason to expect that participants’ certainty would be higher at Time 2 than at Time 
1.  On the other hand, the well-established finding that people are motivated by a need to 
appear consistent with their previous behaviors and commitments (Cialdini & Trost 
1998) poses the possibility that participants’ self-reports may not vary significantly 
between sessions.  Because participants answered all of the self-report questions during 
the first session, they should, in theory, be committed to those responses (if they can 
recall them), and, therefore, give consistent responses during the second session. 
 To investigate these competing hypotheses, difference scores were computed by 
subtracting participants’ Time 1 scores from their Time 2 scores for all the self-report 
variables.  A positive difference score indicates an increase from Time 1 to Time 2 and a 
negative difference score indicates a decrease from Time 1 to Time 2.  A one-way 
ANOVA on the difference scores (equivalent to a test of the condition by time 
interaction) indicated that there was a significant effect of feedback condition for the 
difference in participants’ identification certainty, F(2, 111) = 3.47, p = .04.  The reported 
certainty for participants who received confirming postidentification feedback increased 
substantially (Mdiff = 7.8; t(36) = 3.813, p = .001) from Time 1 to Time 2 relative to the 
certainty reports of the disconfirming feedback and no feedback groups, which remained 
relatively stable over the 48-hour delay, (Disconfirming M = -.7, No feedback M = -1.9). 
Follow-up Games-Howell simple effects tests revealed that there was a significant 
difference between the confirming feedback and no feedback groups, Mdiff = 9.8, p = .02, 
d = .66, 95% CI [1.3, 18.3], and a marginally significant difference between the 
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confirming feedback and disconfirming feedback groups, Mdiff = 8.6, p = .08, d = .50, 
95% CI [-0.7, 17.9].  The difference scores for the disconfirming feedback and no 
feedback groups did not differ significantly.   
A significant effect of feedback condition was also found for the change in 
participants’ reported basis for having made an identification, F(2, 111) = 3.29, p = .04.  
Participants in the control group exhibited more of a decrease in the belief that they had a 
good basis to have made an identification during the first session (M = -1.19) than did 
participants who received confirming feedback (M = -.08) or disconfirming feedback (M 
= -.78).  Games-Howell pair-wise comparisons indicated that the only significant 
difference was between the confirming feedback and no feedback groups, Mdiff = 1.11, p 
= .03, d = .64, 95% CI [.10, 2.12].  None of the participants’ responses on the other self-
report measures differed significantly from Time 1 to Time 2. 
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CHAPTER 6.  DISCUSSION 
Primary Measures 
The principal aim of this experiment was to test the hypothesis that 
postidentification feedback hampers witnesses’ recognition memory of the originally-
witnessed culprit.  This was carried out by comparing similarity ratings, rankings, and 
identification choices in a memory test of individuals who received confirming feedback, 
disconfirming feedback, or no feedback about their inaccurate identification.  Results 
suggest that postidentification feedback has some negative consequences for eyewitness 
memory.  It was found that giving participants feedback about an identification that is 
inaccurate can hamper their ability to make recognition-based distinctions between the 
originally-witnessed culprit and other never-before-viewed individuals.  Participants who 
received disconfirming feedback exhibited the lowest performance on the three aspects of 
the memory test (similarity ratings, rankings, and identification accuracy).  Participants 
who received confirming feedback also tended to underperform relative to participants in 
the control group; however, these differences failed to reach statistical significance.   
It is interesting to note that feedback primarily exerted an influence on the 
similarity ratings for the filler photo ratings rather than for the culprit’s photo.  All three 
feedback groups rated the culprit as being relatively equally similar to their memory of 
the culprit; group differences only emerged on the similarity ratings of the filler photos.  
Participants in the disconfirming feedback condition (and to a lesser extent, the 
confirming feedback condition), rated the filler photos as relatively more similar to their 
memory of the culprit than did the control group.  Supporters of the McCloskey and 
Zaragoza (1985) argument that the original memory trace is not affected by 
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misinformation would likely see these data as consistent with the notion of memory 
permanence.  Indeed, the present findings seem to suggest that the feedback created 
memory interference by planting additional faces in memory without actually harming 
memory for the original face. Nevertheless, this effect of feedback on filler similarity 
ratings resulted in smaller difference scores between the culprit and the fillers for the 
groups that received feedback relative to the control group.  To put it a different way, 
giving participants feedback about their inaccurate identifications seemed to impair their 
ability to discriminate between the culprit and never-before-seen individuals.   
Further evidence supporting the claim that feedback negatively affects witnesses’ 
recognition memory can be seen in the pattern of choosing accuracy rates.  When 
prompted to make an identification, participants who received feedback tended to be less 
accurate at picking out the culprit from the set of photos than participants who were not 
given feedback about their identification.  This effect was not due to a difference in the 
belief or expectation that the culprit was in the second photo set; the three groups were 
equally likely to respond “yes” to the question “Do you think any of the people in the 
lineup was the person from the video?”  This is an important consideration because it 
rules out the possibility that the feedback manipulation led some participants, but not 
others, to be more or less likely to believe that the man from the video was in the photo 
spread. 
Given that the clearest effects of feedback were when it was disconfirming, the 
focus of the discussion will be oriented predominantly around the finding that 
disconfirming feedback leads to a decrease in memory test performance.  Recall that 
predictions regarding the effects of disconfirming feedback on witness memory took two 
34 
 
forms.  The first hypothesis was that witnesses who received disconfirming feedback 
would retain a stronger memory of the originally-witnessed culprit.  This was based on 
the idea that if witnesses are “forced” to make an identification from a lineup, they may 
pick someone who does not exactly match their memory of the culprit.  Thus, being told 
that their identification was inaccurate would allow them to revert back to their memory 
of the culprit from the video, thereby reinforcing the (accurate) memory.  Conversely, the 
second hypothesis—the memory interference hypothesis—held that disconfirming 
feedback would negatively affect witnesses’ memory of the culprit.  The memory-
interference hypothesis was based on the idea that that to the extent that witnesses assume 
that the culprit was present in the first lineup, disconfirming feedback suggested to them 
that their judgment of who looked most like the culprit was incorrect and that it was one 
of the rejected lineup members instead. Because the rejected lineup members were less 
similar to the culprit than was the identified lineup member, there was greater potential to 
lead them to adjust their memories away from their original memory and toward one of 
the rejected lineup members. This was presumed to be a potential source of interference 
that would lead to decreased performance on the memory test.  Because participants in 
this study were given biased lineup instructions that have been shown to increase the 
expectation that the culprit is present in the lineup (e.g., they were not told that the culprit 
may or may not be present and they were not given an option to select “not there”), it is 
reasonable to think that participants who received disconfirming feedback assumed that 
the culprit was one of the rejected members of the lineup.   
The results of this study lend support to the memory-interference hypothesis; 
participants who received disconfirming feedback performed more poorly on a test of 
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recognition memory than did participants who did not receive feedback.  Whereas 
individuals in the confirming feedback group were confronted with interference resulting 
from the reinforcement of the misidentified individual, participants who received 
disconfirming feedback were potentially faced with interference from a number of 
photos—as many as five—from the first lineup who, on average, would resemble the 
culprit less than did the one they originally identified.  The resulting interference would 
conceivably be more destructive, then, for participants who received disconfirming 
feedback than for those who received confirming feedback.  Hence, the memory-
interference interpretation posits a general process that underlies memory impairment for 
both feedback groups: postidentification feedback reinforces a memory (or memories) 
that interfere(s) with witnesses’ memory for the originally-witnessed person.  Confirming 
feedback leads to the reinforcement of the misidentified person, whereas disconfirming 
feedback leads to the potential reinforcement of rejected members of the initial lineup, 
thereby causing decreased performance on a memory test of the culprit. 
Another possible interpretation for the decreased performance of participants who 
received disconfirming feedback is that the feedback caused them to doubt the accuracy 
of their own memory. If participants who received disconfirming feedback simply lost 
confidence in their memory, the results of this study could be explained by the idea that 
these participants strategically exhibited caution when they completed the memory test.  
For example, they may have avoided making any extreme judgments or commitments to 
any of the photographs because they had already in a sense been “burned” by a bad 
decision.  This interpretation would not require a memory impairment to have occurred at 
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all; rather, the pattern of results may simply reflect a deliberate attempt to avoid being 
wrong again.   
Perhaps the best evidence against this interpretation is that participants in the 
disconfirming feedback group were no less likely to voluntarily attempt to identify the 
culprit during the final memory test, suggesting that they were not simply “gun shy”, but 
rather that their memory was legitimately impaired by the feedback.  Furthermore, the 
relative extremity of participants’ ratings for the culprit’s photograph did not differ 
between feedback conditions.  It was the similarity ratings of the filler photos that 
contributed primarily to differences in discriminatory recognition memory between 
groups.  If the impaired performance of participants who received disconfirming 
feedback was due to a strategic effort to exhibit caution during the memory test, it is not 
clear why participants would not have rendered a more conservative judgment on their 
similarity rating for the culprit.  The memory-interference interpretation provides a more 
parsimonious explanation for the observed pattern of results. 
The results become even clearer when one considers the unique characteristics of 
the interfering lineup photographs for participants who received disconfirming versus 
confirming feedback.  It is safe to say that most, if not all, of the participants chose from 
the first lineup the person who most closely resembled their memory of the man in the 
video.  Indeed, there is a strong line of research indicating that when witnesses expect 
that the culprit is in the lineup, they tend to choose the person who, relative to the other 
members of the lineup, most closely resembles their memory of the culprit (Wells, 1984).  
An examination of the choosing rates from the first lineup indicated that one of the lineup 
members, Number 4, was preferred above all others; he was chosen by 54.4% of the 
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sample, with the remainder of the identifications being distributed more or less evenly 
across the other photos. The fact that Number 4 was chosen by a majority of the 
participants suggests that, relative to the other lineup members, he most closely matched 
the appearance of the culprit. It stands to reason, then, that reinforcing this choice among 
the confirming feedback group could potentially benefit those participants in terms of the 
subsequent memory test because it reinforces the image of the person who is arguably the 
most similar in appearance to the actual culprit.  On the other hand, telling participants in 
the disconfirming feedback group that they made an inaccurate identification may 
suggest that the culprit looks different than the misidentified individual.   
If this proposition is true, then it would be expected that participants who received 
confirming feedback after choosing photo Number 4—the closest match to the culprit—
would perform better than participants who received confirming feedback after choosing 
someone other than Number 4. It would also be expected that the performance of 
participants who received disconfirming feedback after choosing Number 4 would be 
lower than participants who chose Number 4 but were given no feedback.  An 
examination of the choosing accuracy rates for the three conditions supports both of these 
predictions (Table 4).  And it is not the case that participants who failed to pick Number 4 
from the first lineup were simply worse witnesses than participants who picked Number 
4; in the control group, the choosing accuracy rates were effectively identical for those 
who chose Number 4 and those who did not.  But participants who received confirming 
feedback after picking photo Number 4 were more accurate in identifying the culprit 
during the memory test than were participants who received confirming feedback after 
choosing someone other than Number 4 (χ2 = 4.75, p = .04).  This finding is particularly 
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interesting because it violates the general pattern that has been seen thus far—namely, 
that the confirming feedback group tended to perform more poorly on the memory test 
than the control group.  In fact, participants who were given confirming feedback after 
picking photo Number 4 had the highest choosing accuracy rates (94% accuracy).   
Table 4 - Identification Accuracy Rates by Condition and Filler Selection 
 Confirming Disconfirming Control 
Chose Number 4 94.74% 79.17% 89.47% 
Did not choose Number 4 66.67% 58.82% 88.24% 
    
 
In contrast, participants who picked photo Number 4 but then received 
disconfirming feedback were relatively less accurate in identifying the culprit during the 
final memory test (79% accuracy) relative to control group participants who chose 
Number 4 (89% accuracy).  Finally, participants who picked someone other than Number 
4 from the first lineup and then received disconfirming feedback were the least accurate 
during the memory test identification task (59% accuracy).  A plausible explanation for 
this finding is that the effects of disconfirming feedback for participants who chose 
someone other than Number 4 were particularly devastating because the feedback 
“moved them away” from an identification of someone who did not closely resemble the 
culprit to begin with.   
Because the majority of participants picked photo Number 4 from the first lineup, 
it can be argued that on the whole, participants who received confirming feedback had a 
relative advantage over those who received disconfirming feedback because the 
39 
 
misinformation that they received was not as discordant with their original memory as it 
was for those who were given disconfirming feedback.  In other words, the 
misinformation that was given to the disconfirming feedback group (that the person who 
best matched their memory of the culprit was not the culprit) may have led them astray 
from their original, potentially rather strong memory of the culprit.  These results beg the 
question of what happens in the real world when a suspect who does not very closely 
resemble the crime culprit is mistakenly identified and reinforced with confirming 
feedback.  According to the relative judgment conceptualization (Wells, 1984), this may 
happen more often than one might expect, because relative judgments allow the witness 
to make an identification based on relative, rather than absolute, similarity judgments.  
Because there will always be someone who most closely matches the appearance of the 
culprit than do the other lineup members, the person who ends up being identified may 
actually look quite dissimilar to the person who committed the crime.  These findings 
suggest that the degree to which the misidentified person resembles the culprit is an 
important determinant of the amount of memory interference that may result from 
reinforcement of the misidentification. 
Another argument that can be made in light of the present data is that witnesses 
with the weakest memory are the ones who are most affected by postidentification 
feedback.  To the extent that we can assume that participants who chose someone other 
than Number 4 from the culprit-absent lineup were the participants with the weakest 
memory, it suggests that the feedback effects on memory might be greatest for witnesses 
who, for whatever reason, have a weaker memory to begin with.  In theory, witnesses 
with a very strong memory of the culprit may be able to perform reasonably well on a 
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recognition memory test, even when they are first forced to make an identification and 
then are given misleading postidentification feedback.  In this study, overall memory is 
rather strong.  Participants had a clear view of the culprit’s face in a high quality color 
video, and their memory of the culprit was tested just 48-hours after viewing the video.  
Introducing an appreciably longer delay, giving participants a poorer view, or 
implementing any other manipulation that serves to reduce the quality of participants’ 
initial memory may have led to more pronounced effects of feedback on the final 
memory test.  Because this study did not manipulate memory strength, conclusive 
statements cannot be made about the role played by memory strength in moderating the 
effects of feedback on memory of the culprit.  However, results of the above analyses 
suggest that feedback may be most impactful when witnesses’ memory is weaker.  
Ancillary measures 
Another interesting and perhaps unexpected finding was that the certainty of 
participants who received confirming postidentification feedback increased from Time 1 
to Time 2 whereas the certainty reports of participants in the disconfirming and no 
feedback conditions remained stable over time.  Past research has found that eyewitness 
confidence increases as a result of repeated questioning (Shaw, 1996; Shaw & McClure, 
1996) or if witnesses are told to prepare for cross-examination (Wells et al., 1981).  It is 
important to point out that the present experiment did not specifically manipulate 
participants’ expectations for cross-examination or the number of times participants were 
questioned; all participants were told that they would be asked additional questions about 
their identification, and all participants were questioned two times.  But in the present 
study, it was only among the confirming feedback group that an inflation of certainty 
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occurred, suggesting at the very least that the tendency for certainty to become inflated 
may be even more pronounced among witnesses who receive confirming 
postidentification feedback.  Furthermore, it is reasonable to presume that the observed 
effect would be even stronger if participants were not asked about their certainty during 
the first session. Indeed, providing an initial certainty statement may have anchored 
participants to their response, thereby limiting the extent to which inflation could occur.   
The dominant theory of how confirming postidentification feedback exerts such 
strong effects on witnesses’ retrospective certainty reports may be able to shed some light 
on this intriguing finding.  According to the theory, witnesses do not form online memory 
traces for how certain they were at the time of the identification, so witnesses who 
receive postidentification feedback rely on the feedback to infer and reconstruct their 
level of certainty when they are asked (Wells et al., 2003).  The feedback effect is 
theorized to persist over time because witnesses’ memory trace for their pre-feedback 
certainty is weak (if present at all), but the memory for the feedback itself remains 
relatively strong.  It is not a far stretch to reason that as time passes, witnesses’ internal 
cues to their pre-feedback certainty become increasingly weaker while memory for the 
feedback remains quite robust, thereby exerting a disproportionate influence on 
witnesses’ retrospective certainty estimates with the passage of time.  Why then, wasn’t 
there a parallel affect of certainty deflation for participants who received disconfirming 
feedback?  One possibility is that participants who received disconfirming feedback 
remembered being surprised by the feedback.  Given that they probably “gave it their 
best shot” during the first identification, they may have experienced a feeling of surprise 
when they were told that their identification was inaccurate.  If participants remembered 
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the feedback and their reaction to the feedback, this could have provided a clue about 
their level of certainty before the feedback, rendering it less susceptible to deflation 
effects.  Another possibility is that floor effects were at play for participants who received 
disconfirming feedback.  Their certainty at Time 1 was below the midpoint of the scale 
(45.4%), which was already considerably lower than the 56.1% certainty of the control 
group.  It would be improbable for participants in the disconfirming feedback group to 
report having been even less certain, given the necessity of having some justification for 
making an identification. 
Little research has examined whether the effects of postidentification feedback on 
witnesses’ certainty reports vary as a function of when the certainty report is collected, 
and the research that has been conducted is rather inconclusive. In a study by Wells, 
Olson, and Charman (2003), feedback and time delay for the collection of a certainty 
statement were manipulated.  Witnesses received confirming, disconfirming, or no 
feedback, and they were asked about their certainty immediately after receiving feedback 
or after a 48-hour delay.  Although not statistically significant, the data conformed to a 
similar pattern as was seen in the present work.  Specifically, witnesses who received 
confirming feedback and were asked immediately about their certainty were on average 
64% certain in their identification, whereas witnesses who received confirming feedback 
and were asked about their certainty 48 hours later were on average 76% certain in their 
identification.  Further paralleling the present findings, the control group in the Wells et 
al. study showed less of an increase from immediate to delayed assessments (6%), and 
the disconfirming feedback group showed a slight decrease from immediate to delayed 
assessments (-4%), though neither of these differences was statistically significant.  The 
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12-point inflation among the confirming feedback group in the Wells et al. study was an 
even larger increase than the 7.8-point increase in the present study.  So why wasn’t their 
result statistically significant?  It could be due to the fact that certainty was a between-
subjects variable in the Wells et al. study—witnesses were asked about their certainty 
either immediately or after 48 hours, whereas in the present research, it was a within-
subjects variable—witnesses were asked about their certainty immediately and again after 
48 hours.  Lacking the benefit of within-group comparisons, the standard deviations in 
the Wells et al. study were slightly larger than they were in the present study.  On the 
whole, their findings are consistent with the notion that the certainty of witnesses who 
receive confirming feedback may continue to inflate over time, whereas the certainty of 
witnesses who receive disconfirming or no feedback seems to remain relatively stable. 
In another study, Neuchatz and his colleagues (2007) manipulated feedback and 
delay of confidence assessment in an examination of the efficacy of a confidence 
prophylactic, which is designed to protect against the inflating effects of feedback.  All 
witnesses were asked to rate their confidence after their identification and before the 
experimental manipulations (confidence prophylactic).  Some witnesses were then given 
confirming feedback and others were given no feedback.  Witnesses completed a 
confidence assessment either immediately or after a one-week delay.  The mean level of 
confidence was 4.1 (on a seven point scale) for witnesses who were asked about their 
certainty immediately after receiving feedback and 5.4 for witnesses who were 
interviewed after the one-week delay.  The researchers concluded that the confidence 
prophylactic works immediately but not after a period of delay, but the results of the 
current research provide a different perspective on these data.   Because the researchers 
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did not include a control group with no confidence prophylactic, there is no way to know 
whether the inflation in witness certainty between the immediate and delay conditions 
was truly due to the confidence prophylactic wearing off or if witnesses who received 
confirming feedback became more confident over time.  In other words, it is possible that 
there was a main effect of the confidence prophylactic in addition to a main effect of the 
passage of time.  It is impossible to draw any definitive conclusions from these data, but 
they are certainly not inconsistent with the current study’s findings.  
There are some limitations to the present research that need to be considered.  
First, at the time of the final memory test, participants were still under the impression that 
the feedback was accurate.  Although this was seen as a unique and desirable 
characteristic of the present study, it would also be useful to perform another experiment 
in which the feedback is discredited before witnesses are tested on their memory.  This is 
what sometimes happens in the real world when witnesses are informed that the person 
they misidentified is found to be factually innocent.  A replication of the present findings 
under these circumstances would provide even stronger evidence in support of the idea 
that postidentification feedback about an inaccurate identification impairs witnesses’ 
memory of the original culprit. 
Another limitation of the present research is with regard to the apparent certainty 
inflation that occurred over time among participants in the confirming feedback group.  
Because the change in participants’ certainty between Time 1 and Time 2 was of 
peripheral interest to the present study, the order in which the certainty measure was 
collected may have created a peculiar confound.  Before participants were asked about 
their certainty during the second session, they performed other tasks such as rating, 
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ranking, and picking from a photo spread the person who they believed most resembled 
the man from the video.  Critics could argue that characteristics particular to these tasks 
are responsible for the certainty inflation effect.  However, this contention does not seem 
like a plausible explanation for the results because the certainty inflation occurred only 
among the participants who received confirming feedback.  There is no apparent reason 
that performing the memory test tasks during the second session would uniquely inflate 
the certainty of participants who received confirming feedback.  On the other hand, there 
is theoretical support for the idea that certainty inflation would occur over time for 
witnesses who received confirming postidentification feedback.  It could be the case that 
time exerts an influence only when witnesses have already “started in the direction” of 
feeling more confident.  In other words, providing confirming postidentification feedback 
may start a process of inflation that continues to grow as witnesses’ memory for their 
phenomenological experience of the identification fades and the memory for the feedback 
remains.  But, these are theoretical speculations that should be tested in future research.   
Future research can rather easily deal with the limitations of this work as well as 
address some of the theoretical interpretations that were proposed as opposing accounts 
to the memory-interference hypothesis.  It would be useful to test the possibility that 
decreased performance on the final memory test among participants who received 
disconfirming feedback resulted because of an increased caution and an avoidance of 
making extreme judgments during the final test.  Although multiple internal analyses 
largely discredited this interpretation, it is important to rule it out more definitively.  
More importantly, it is critical to perform an empirical test of the memory-interference 
hypothesis, which is based on the assumption that the poor performance of participants in 
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the disconfirming feedback condition was due to interference from other members of the 
first photo lineup.  Future research should examine whether witnesses who receive 
disconfirming feedback actually attempt to recall the other photos from the first lineup.  
If this were the case, witnesses should be expected to have (1) believed that the culprit 
was someone else in the first lineup and (2) deliberately reflected about the other 
members of the lineup after they received disconfirming feedback.  These two points 
could be addressed in a study that asks witnesses (1) whether or not they believed that the 
culprit was someone else in the lineup and (2) whether they found themselves “thinking 
back” to the first lineup in an effort to determine who was the culprit. Another method of 
examining whether this reasoning took place without relying on witnesses’ self-reports of 
their mental processes is to give witnesses a test of their memory for the filler photos.  If 
giving disconfirming feedback prompts witnesses to attempt to recall the other photos 
from the first lineup, then we would expect them to have a stronger memory for these 
photos than would the other two groups.  Yet another way to test the memory-
interference hypothesis as it applies to the disconfirming feedback group is by 
manipulating the expectation that the culprit is present in the first lineup or by outright 
telling witnesses that the culprit is not in the lineup.  This would obviate the necessity for 
witnesses to recollect the first lineup, and these witnesses should then show equal 
performance to the control group on a memory test of the culprit.  Until these empirical 
tests are carried out, the memory-interference interpretation provides a coherent 
explanation for the present research finding that postidentification feedback negatively 
affects witness memory, with disconfirming feedback being relatively more destructive 
than confirming feedback.   
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The lack of highly statistically significant effects of feedback on memory test 
performance could be interpreted as a lack of support for the hypothesis that feedback 
impairs witnesses’ ability to later recognize the originally-witnessed culprit.  On the other 
hand, the fact that the hypothesized trends were observed at all within the present 
experimental paradigm could be viewed as rather compelling, albeit preliminary, support 
of the hypothesis.  The misinformation-absent test is known to be rather insensitive to 
detecting misinformation effects.  Nevertheless, recognition memory test performance 
was impaired by the feedback.  Moreover, participants in this study were under little 
stress during the witnessed event and had a rather strong memory to begin with, had 
minimal personal investment in the outcome of their performance, and completed the 
memory test only 48 hours after witnessing the original event.  What might have 
happened if other characteristics that exist in real cases were included in the study?  For 
example, over the course of criminal cases, an eyewitness will likely view the original 
photo lineup on multiple occasions.  The witness may also be exposed to pre-trial 
publicity in which the identified person’s image is depicted in local media sources.  
Furthermore, real eyewitnesses to crimes are usually highly personally involved with the 
event, especially if they were the victim of the crime.  The results of this study suggest 
that any factor that makes postidentification feedback more salient or that makes 
witnesses’ initial memory of the culprit weaker would lead to even more pronounced 
feedback effects on memory.  
In the case of Jennifer Thompson, there were multiple and extended sources of 
confirming feedback regarding her identification of Ronald Cotton.  First, Jennifer was 
given feedback by the detective after making the identification from the photo lineup and 
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from the live lineup.  In addition, a second rape victim came forward after Jennifer’s trial 
and fingered Cotton as her rapist.  Perhaps the ultimate reinforcement was the fact that 
Ronald Cotton was convicted of both rapes and served hard time in prison.  In contrast to 
laboratory settings, in the real world there is often repeated reinforcement and the 
influence of such reinforcement is magnified.  To the extent that the present study 
produced overly favorable conditions for memory and thus failed at fully simulating a 
real eyewitness’ experience, the observed effect may not have had the robustness that it 
would have in the real world.  Future research that exposes participants to a staged crime 
and more closely reproduces the powerful reinforcements that often occur in real cases of 
eyewitness identification may better uncover the magnitude of this effect.  Nevertheless, 
the present research can be viewed as preliminary support for the contention that 
postidentification feedback has deleterious consequences for witnesses’ recognition 
memory of the culprit.   
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APPENDIX A.  STILL SHOTS FROM VIDEO 
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APPENDIX B.  CULPRIT-ABSENT LINEUP 
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APPENDIX C.  SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
 
Question (variable names in bold) Scale 
At the time you identified the person from the photo lineup, 
how certain were you that the person you identified from the 
photo lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
10% (not at all certain) to 100% 
(totally certain), in 10% intervals 
How good a view did you get of the person in the video? 0 (very poor) to 10 (very good) 
How well were you able to make out specific features of the 
person’s face from the video? 
0 (not at all) to 10 (very well) 
How much attention were you paying to the face of the 
person in the video while viewing the tape? 
0 (none) to 10 (my total 
attention) 
To what extent do you feel that you had a good basis to 
make an identification? 
0 (no basis at all) to 10 (a very 
good basis) 
How easy or difficult was it for you to figure out which 
person in the photo lineup was the person from the video? 
(ease) 
0 (extremely difficult) to 10 
(extremely easy) 
From the time the lineup started, how much time do you 
estimate it took you to make an identification? 
0 (I needed almost no time) to 10 
(I had to think about the lineup 
for a long time) 
On the basis of your memory of the person in the video, how 
willing would you have been to testify in court that the 
person you identified was the same person you saw in the 
video? 
0 (not at all willing) to 10 (totally 
willing) 
Generally, how good is your recognition memory for faces of 
strangers you have encountered on only one prior occasion? 
0 (very poor) to 10 (excellent) 
How clear is the image you have in your memory of the 
person you saw in the video? 
0 (not at all clear) to 10 (very 
clear) 
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APPENDIX D.  CULPRIT-PRESENT LINEUP 
 
         Culprit is Number 3 
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